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Does the CEO elite education affect firm hedging policies? 
Sabri Boubaker1, Ephraim Clark2 and Salma Mefteh-Wali3 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between CEO elite education and firm hedging 
decisions. It uses the particular specificities of the French post-secondary educational 
institutions to examine the effect of CEO educational background on the use of foreign 
currency derivatives. The results show a positive and significant relationship between 
education quality and derivatives use. Neither the level nor the type of education has 
any significant effect. The results also show that the use of derivatives enhances firm 
performance only when CEOs are from elite institutions. These results are robust to a 
battery of tests that involve alternative estimation techniques, the use of different 
subsamples, additional control variables, and control for endogeneity and selection 
bias.  
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 The view that corporate hedging, particularly through the use of derivatives, can 
affect firm performance is widely shared by investors and corporate managers alike 
and is supported by extensive academic literature (e.g. Smith and Stulz, 1985; Mayers 
and Smith, 1987; Froot et al., 1993; Stultz, 1996; Clark and Mefteh, 2010).4 There is also 
a large body of research showing that CEO education is a significant determinant of 
corporate risk-taking.5 For instance, Beber and Fabbri (2012) show that a CEO with an 
MBA education level is more inclined to adopt a speculative behavior. Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1996), and Barker and Mueller (2002) find that CEOs with technical degrees 
are engaged in more research and development (R&D) activities while CEOs with 
educational backgrounds in business or law tend to be more risk-averse with regard 
to R&D. However, up to now, to the best of our knowledge, the effect of CEO 
education on derivatives use has received no attention. Given the relationship between 
CEO education and corporate risk-taking and the role of derivatives use in corporate 
risk management, this is an important gap in the literature.  
The current paper aims to fill this gap by studying the effect of CEO education 
on the use of foreign currency (FC) derivatives and the relationship between FC use 
and firm performance. We analyze a range of CEO educational characteristics in 
France to get a more complete and nuanced appreciation of the impact of education 
on corporate risk management. 
                                                          
4 The positive theories of firm risk management in the presence of capital market imperfections argue 
that shareholder value can be increased through an overall reduction in exposure, which leads to a 
reduction of external claims on the cash stream flowing from the firm's assets.  
5 Several studies, such as Grable and Joo (2004), Hallahan et al. (2004), Yao et al. (2004) and Fan and Xiao 
(2006), report a positive relationship between education and financial risk tolerance. 
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The major innovation of the paper is that we break education down into three 
components – the level (undergraduate, masters, PhD), the type (engineering, business, 
other) and the quality (top, middle and low ranked institutions). We then empirically 
evaluate the effect of each component or combination of components on foreign 
currency derivatives use and on the relationship between derivatives use and firm 
performance. Our objective is to provide a complete understanding of the relationship 
between the educational training and the risk-taking behavior of CEOs reflected in 
their use of derivatives and the effect of this use on firm performance. The quality of 
educational training can signal acquired knowledge as well as intellectual and 
analytical ability and personality penchants. Besides addressing the gap in the 
academic research, such an understanding is of relevance to the renewed interest by 
regulators on how derivatives are related to risk mitigation and performance.  
This study focuses on foreign currency (FC) derivatives using a sample drawn 
from the largest 250 French firms (CAC all Tradable, former SBF250) observed over 
the period 2004–2012. The French educational system is particularly well suited to our 
study since it offers clear-cut distinctions arising from the strong involvement of the 
state in the creation, support and control of French post-secondary educational 
institutions. These institutions can generally be divided into two main groups – the 
universities and the “Grandes  écoles”. The university system is similar to that in many 
other European countries. It focuses on scholarly pursuits, is generally accessible to 
anyone with a baccalaureate diploma and offers degrees at the undergraduate, 
master’s and PhD level. The “Grandes ecoles” are rooted in the last quarter of the 18th century 
when French royalty initiated the creation of institutions that would train agents qualified to 
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lead the Army, civil engineering projects and agricultural development (Green, 2013). Their 
training is focused on practical matters and decision-making aimed at producing individuals 
endowed with strong scientific competence and capable of synthesizing large quantities of 
information (Thoenig, 1973) as opposed to the intellectual and theoretical pursuits associated 
with the universities 
The empirical analysis begins by testing the impact of education type, level and 
quality on derivatives use. The results provide evidence for a significant relationship 
between education quality and derivatives use. More specifically, they show that “elite” 
education (ENA, HEC and Polytechnique) has a positive and strongly significant impact 
on derivatives use. However, it does not show any significant effect for education type 
or level. The empirical analysis also assesses the contribution of each individual “elite” 
school category to derivatives use. It shows a positive and significant effect for each of 
three elite institutions standing alone. Additional post-estimation tests reject the 
hypothesis that the values of the individual coefficients are equal, providing evidence 
that within the universe of the elite institutions the type of training does affect 
derivatives use. ENA, the political training institution, has the highest coefficient, HEC, 
the business training institution, has the second highest coefficient and Polytechnique, 
engineering training, has the lowest.  
 As a robustness test, in a second step we use factor analysis to extract the two 
factors that reflect our hypothesized underlying fundamental construct of CEO 
educational attainment. The first factor reflects education level whereas the second one, 
composed mainly of "elite institutions" and other non-elite " Grandes écoles ", reflects 
education quality. We then use these two factors as explanatory variables and re-test 
the impact of education on derivatives use. The results confirm the previous findings. 
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We show that only education quality, reflected in factor 2, is positive and statistically 
significant in affecting derivatives use.  
 In the third step we look at how derivatives use affects firm performance. On 
the one hand, the use of derivatives can increase firm performance by reducing risk. 
According to the positive theory of risk management at the firm level in the presence 
of capital market imperfections, shareholder value can be increased by reducing risk. 
The argument is that risk reduction leads to a reduction of external claims on the cash 
stream flowing from the firm's assets, such as taxes, bankruptcy costs (both direct and 
indirect), and/or agency costs to align managerial interests with the interests of capital 
suppliers.6 On the other hand, derivatives use could also decrease firm value. First of 
all, the conception and implementation of a FC hedging strategy with derivatives 
requires a commitment of financial, physical and human resources that can represent 
significant costs for the firm. Thus, to increase firm performance the gains from 
derivatives use must be larger than the costs of implementing the strategy. Second, the 
arguments for increased firm value are based on the assumption that derivatives are 
used for hedging purposes. If this is not the case and they are used for speculation, 
derivatives use could increase risk and decrease firm value. 
 We test the effect of derivatives use on firm performance and find that, overall, 
the use of derivatives does increase firm performance, consistent with Allayannis and 
Weston (2001), Carter et al. (2006) and Bartram et al. (2011), among others. However, 
when we break down the sample according to education quality, derivatives use is 
positive and significant only for firms with CEOs coming from the elite schools. It is 
                                                          
6 See, Aretz and Bartram (2011), for a comprehensive survey and analysis. 
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negative but not always significant for non-elite CEOs. To confirm this result, we use 
factor 2, the factor representing education quality. It is composed of a positive loading 
on the elite variable and a negative loading on the non-elite (other schools) variable. 
We proceed by breaking the sample down according to whether this factor is positive 
or negative. The results consistently show that derivatives use has a positive and 
significant effect on firm value when factor 2 corresponds to CEOs from elite schools. 
The relationship is, however, negative but not always statistically significant when 
factor 2 corresponds to CEOs from other schools. To control for the ongoing nature of 
a strategic derivatives program and the potential problem of endogeneity, we rerun 
all the regressions using a dynamic GMM estimator and find that the results do not 
qualitatively change.  
Our major finding is that only education quality, reflected in three elite 
institutions – Polytechnique (engineering), ENA (political science) and HEC 
(management) - has a significant effect on derivatives use or firm performance. The 
effects are positive and the results are robust to a battery of tests that include, among 
others, alternative estimation techniques, use of different subsamples, additional 
control variables, and control for endogeneity. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on CEO education and risk management and presents the institutional 
background of the French educational system. Section 3 describes the data, details the 
methodology, and defines the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 
discusses the main empirical results. Section 5 presents the analysis of derivatives use 
on firm value. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
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2. Related literature 
2.1.CEO education and risk management decisions 
Several studies, such as Grable and Joo (2004), Hallahan et al. (2004), Yao et al. 
(2004) and Fan and Xiao (2006), report a positive relationship between education and 
the willingness to take risk. Education is thought to increase a person’s capacity to 
evaluate risks inherent to the investment process and therefore endow them with a 
higher financial risk tolerance. Besides the relationship between education and risk 
tolerance in general, education can also influence CEO risk management decision 
making. To understand this impact of CEO education on risk management decisions, 
it is important to take into account three components of education: its level, its type 
and its quality. Kimberly and Evansiko (1981), Bantel and Jackson (1989), Hitt and 
Tyler (1991), Thomas et. al. (1991), Wiersema and Bantel (1992), and Wally and Baum 
(1994) have found that more educated CEOs are better able to process information and 
are more receptive to change than CEOs with lower educational attainment.  
The level of education can be a reflection of cognitive ability (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984), knowledge, skills and openness to change (Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Many papers in the management literature have 
postulated that managers with higher educational attainment will have better 
cognitive abilities, training or social ties that may improve firm performance  
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1999, Beber and Fabbri, 2012, Miller et al., 2015).   
The type of education received can signal a personality penchant, such as 
quantitative versus verbal or practical versus theoretical. Kiesler and Sproull (1982) 
explain that background characteristics and experiences reflect a CEO’s underlying 
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psychological orientation and knowledge base. A quantitative personality, for 
example, may find it easier than a verbal personality to understand a complicated 
derivative instrument and when and how to use it. In addition to signaling personality 
penchants, the type of education can also impact managers' use of derivatives and 
appetite for risk-taking because it affects the ability to recognize risky situations and 
the usefulness of risk reducing techniques. For instance, it is likely that a CEO with an 
MBA degree has studied financial risk and the derivative instruments that can be used 
to hedge it.  Beber and Fabbri (2012) find that in forex markets, CEOs with MBAs are 
engaged in speculation because management education breeds overconfidence and 
greater tolerance to risk. In addition, the educational background could matter for risk 
management because it provides the manager with better information. For example, 
MBA degree holders could have an information advantage relative to the market that 
allows them to forecast future exchange rate movements more accurately. 
Furthermore, the quality of education can matter to risk management decisions. 
In fact, besides the benefits associated with superior lecturers and course content, the 
quality of educational training could also reflect innate ability (Herrmann and Datta, 
2005) as, for example, when the best institutions base their entry criteria on competitive 
exams. In a similar vein, we could envision that CEO graduates from well ranked 
business schools are more likely to be overconfident and thus more risk tolerant, 
possibly because the MBA is simply perceived as the best degree in general 
management. Consistent with this idea, other papers document that managers holding 
an MBA degree follow more aggressive strategies (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).  
2.2.The Institutional Background : French educational system  
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The distinguishing feature of the French system resides mainly in what is known 
as the “Grandes écoles”. The “Grandes écoles” go back to the 18th century when French 
royalty created institutions to train highly-skilled and qualified citizens to lead the 
Army, civil engineering projects and agricultural development (Green, 2013). This approach 
was widely adopted over the years to train professionals who are able to reinforce the 
state’s authority and capacity to control and rule the country. It was also linked to 
mistrust towards the universities that were considered as either excessively oriented 
towards scholarly teaching, under religious influence, or too independent to produce 
highly-skilled and competent military and civil servants (Van Zanten and Maxwell, 
2015).  
The “Grandes écoles” feature a process of selection by merit through very 
competitive examinations, called “Concours”, for a small number of annual places. 
Their training is focused on decision-making and practical matters to produce 
individuals endowed with strong scientific competence and capable of synthesizing 
large quantities of information (Thoenig, 1973) as opposed to the intellectual and 
theoretical pursuits associated with the universities. The “Grandes écoles” themselves 
can be divided into two main groups. The first group is composed of the very elite 
schools, namely, École Nationale d’Administration (ENA), École Polytechnique 
(Polytechnique) and École des Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC). These three elite 
“Grandes écoles” are richly endowed with generous amounts of human and financial 
resources and alone account for 46% of French managers in firms listed in the CAC40 
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equity index (Dudouet and Joly, 2010).7 The second group is comprised of the other 
institutions that are less prestigious and less competitive but still based on the basic 
model of the “Grandes écoles”. 
This post-secondary organization provides us with some interesting distinctions. 
The first one refers to student quality that contrasts the “Grandes écoles” based on a 
very selective merit system for a small number of places with that of the university 
that is accessible to anyone with a baccalaureate diploma.8 The second distinction is 
one of training quality that contrasts the “Grandes écoles” with the university and the 
elite “Grandes écoles” with the other “Grandes écoles”. The third distinction is one of type 
that contrasts the non-utilitarian university culture traditionally oriented towards 
teaching, scholarship and research with the utilitarian culture of the “Grandes écoles” 
oriented towards practical matters and decision-making. The last distinction is one of 
level that contrasts the undergraduate, masters, “Grandes écoles” and PhD levels. Thus, 
the French post-secondary education model allows us to extend our understanding of 
the mechanisms that shape derivatives use and their effect on firm performance and 
will, we hope, inspire further work drawing on a similar framework in other national 
contexts. 
3. Data and methodology 
                                                          
7 According to an estimate made by "Droit d'inventaire" diffused on “France 3” Television on September 
17th, 2008, the French government spends on average twice as much per “Grandes écoles” student as it 
does for a university student in the same type of training. 
8 Frey and Detterman (2004) explain that CEOs from schools that require higher mean entrance exam 
scores are more intelligent and display greater managerial ability as they can process more information. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that fund managers generate higher returns when they are graduated 
from universities with tougher entry requirements.   
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The initial sample starts with the largest 250 French firms (CAC all Tradable, 
former SBF250) observed over the period 2004–2012. Financial firms are excluded 
because it is difficult to distinguish between their hedging and their trading activities. 
We also exclude firms that are not exposed to exchange risk as stated in their financial 
reports, firms that do not disclose anything on their hedging strategies, and firms with 
missing accounting and financial data. Data on firm hedging policies were collected 
manually from the annual reports. Stock market and financial data were extracted 
from the Datastream and Thomson One Banker databases, respectively. Data on CEO 
educational backgrounds are from the Corporate Governance Database of IODS 
(Insead OEE Data Service) or collected manually. Our final sample consists of 121 
unique firms, making an unbalanced sample of 1,089 firm-year observations.  
The following baseline model estimates a regression with derivatives use as the 
dependent variable and CEO education proxies as variables of interest. It also includes 
a set of control variables deemed to explain FC derivatives. 
Derivatives use = f (CEO education, Control variables, Year dummies, Firm fixed effects)    
(1) 
 The proxy for derivatives use, noted Derivatives, is the notional amount of 
foreign currency derivatives scaled by the book value of total assets. To proxy for CEO 
education we gather information that reflects the type, level and quality of the CEO’s 
educational background. For the type of training we distinguish among three 
categories, namely, Engineering, Management, and Other. This distinction is based on 
descriptive statistics that show that “Engineering” and “Management” categories 
account for over 78% of the total sample. For the level of education we distinguish 
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among undergraduate, masters, PhD, and Schools. For education quality we make 
several distinctions. First, we distinguish between university and Schools. Second, we 
separate the elite schools from non-elite schools. Third, we break the elite schools into 
groups by distinguishing between ENA, Polytechnique and HEC. Panel A of Table 1 
describes the foregoing education variables.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the frequency distribution of the education variables. 
Interestingly, 57.48% (626 out of 1089) of the sample CEOs had management training 
and 20.56% (224 out of 1089) were engineers. Overall, 25.34% (276 out of 1089) of CEOs 
graduated from the University, 69.80% (760 out of 1089) come from the Schools and 
only 4.86% have no higher education degree. Of the CEOs graduated from the 
university 61.95% (171 out of 276) hold an undergraduate degree, 19.57% hold a Master 
degree and 18.48% hold a PhD. Of the CEOs graduated from the Schools, 42.1% come 
from the elite Schools of Polytechnique, ENA or HEC. Of the Elite CEOs, Polytechnique 
represents 50.2%, followed by ENA (26.56%) and HEC (23.43%).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Our model includes a range of control variables deemed to affect derivatives 
use (e.g. Geczy et al. 1997, Allayannis and Ofek, 2001 and Graham and Rogers, 2002; 
among others). They are divided into two groups.  
 The first group refers to common firm characteristics such as size, growth 
opportunities, liquidity, leverage and substitutes for hedging. Firm size can affect 
derivatives use in several ways. First, the cost of setting up and managing a derivatives 
program may be unaffordable for small firms (Smith and Stulz, 1985). On the other 
hand, small firms often experience relatively high bankruptcy costs and thereby could 
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use derivatives to hedge financial risk as a means of reducing these costs (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Mayers and Smith, 1987 and Stulz, 1996). To account for this we use the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (Size).  
 Growth opportunities can also affect hedging decisions in the sense that 
investment and financing plans can be affected by unfavorable cash-flow fluctuations 
that force the firm to give up positive NPV projects or to resort to costly external 
financing (see, Froot et al., 1993). Hedging can offset this risk. We proxy for growth 
opportunities using the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets (Capex Ratio). 
 We use the quick ratio (Quick Ratio) to control for the liquidity effect on the use 
of derivatives. This ratio is traditionally used to measure firm short-term solvency. It 
is measured as the ratio of cash accounts and marketable securities to short-term 
liabilities and is expected to be negatively related to the use of derivatives (Nance et 
al., 1993; Géczy et al., 1997 et Graham and Rogers, 2002). Dividend policy may also 
require the need for hedging in the short term to ensure the availability of funds 
(Nance et al, 1993). Thus, we include the dividend yield ratio (Dividend Ratio) measured 
as dividend divided by share price at year-end. In the longer term, hedging company 
cash flows can reduce the risk of bankruptcy caused by high levels of long term debt 
(Berkman and Bradbury, 1996 and Haushalter, 2000). To account for this we use the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets (Leverage).  
 The second group refers to personal characteristics of the CEO that might affect 
risk aversion and derivatives use. There is evidence that older CEOs are more risk 
averse than younger CEOs because the costs of failure and the difficulty of getting 
rehired increase with age, especially as retirement age approaches (Beber and Fabbri, 
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2012). Thus, older executives would be more inclined to use derivatives to minimize 
random fluctuations in firm performance. To account for this we include the age of the 
CEO in years (CEO_Age ) as a control variable. There is also evidence that the number 
of years that the CEO has held the position affects risk aversion and derivatives use. 
May (1995) considers that tenure length is a proxy of undiversified human capital. 
Mian (1996) echoes this and suggests that it is an indicator of firm specific managerial 
competence that has little or no value outside the firm.  Thus, since hedging reduces 
the manager’s human capital risk, firms where managers feature a long tenure period 
are more inclined to use derivatives. Gibbons and Murphy (1992), however, argue that 
managers with long tenure as CEO in the firm have a well-developed reputation and 
do not need to signal the quality of their management through hedging activities. To 
account for the effect of tenure we include the number of years that the CEO has held 
the position (CEO_Tenure) as a control variable, but have no prior as to its sign. The 
descriptive statistics of derivatives use and the control variables are displayed in Table 
2.9 
 The average notional value of the portfolio of derivatives is 11.52% of total 
assets. Some firms in the sample do not use foreign currency derivatives. On average, 
the CEO is 55 years old and has been the CEO for more than 10 years. The sample 
includes large and small firms with an average Size of 21.22 (natural logarithm of total 
assets measured in millions). The average Capex Ratio of 0.0489 and that of the Quick 
Ratio is 1.017 whereas that of the Dividend Ratio is 2.16%. 
                                                          
9  The appendix presents the pairwise correlation matrix. We note that Derivatives is negatively 
correlated to University and positively related to School. However, when schools are divided on two 




[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 CEO education and FC derivatives use  
We start by testing for the effect of type, level and quality of training education 
on derivatives use (Derivatives). We run panel regressions with firm and year fixed 
effects. The firm fixed effect is designed to control for the unobservable firm 
characteristics influencing the level of derivatives use so that the CEO effect can be 
separated from firm characteristics.10 The year fixed effects are included to control for 
unobserved year-specific effects.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The results reported in Panel A (Table 3) test for the type of education training. 
They show that there is no significant relationship between the type of education and 
derivatives use.11 None of the three variables- Engineering, Management and Other - are 
significant at any conventional level. Interestingly, however, the other CEO 
characteristics, CEO_Age and CEO_Tenure, are highly significant, suggesting that 
derivatives use increases with CEO age and decreases with CEO tenure. Older CEOs 
are more likely to use more foreign currency derivatives. This result is consistent with 
Beber and Fabbri (2012) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who show that older 
managers take less risk in corporate investment decisions and financial policies. 
However, long-tenured CEOs seem to use less derivatives since they are highly-
                                                          
10 As a robustness test we also use propensity score matching to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
bias. See, section 3.4.2. 
11 Mandal and Doukas (2018) find similar results for their US sample. 
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confident about their way of managing the firm. Firm size, the quick ratio and leverage 
have a significant, negative effect on derivatives use. 
 
 The results in Panel B of Table 3 on education training level provide weak 
evidence that the level of education does affect derivatives use. When university levels 
stand alone, PhD has a weak, negative correlation with derivatives use. However, 
when combined with “School”, its significance falls below the conventional 10% level, 
but School is positive and weakly significant. All the other significant control variables 
from Table 3- CEO_Age, CEO_Tenure, Size, Quick Ratio and Dividend Ratio– keep the 
same signs and remain significant. 
 Panel C (Table 3) distinguishes between the non-selective, non-utilitarian 
quality of university training traditionally oriented towards teaching, scholarship and 
research with the selective, utilitarian quality of the “Grandes écoles” oriented towards 
practical problems and decision-making. We find that University training education 
has no significant effect on derivatives use. “Grandes écoles” training, on the other hand, 
has a weakly significant, positive effect on derivatives use. This is consistent with the 
results of Panel B (Table 3) where we compared the effect of different training levels. 
All the other significant control variables from Panels A and B - CEO_Age, CEO_Tenure , 
Size, Quick Ratio and Dividend Ratio– keep the same signs and remain statistically 
significant. 
 To pursue the role that the “Grandes écoles” seem to play in derivatives use based 
on the results of Panels B and C of Table 3, we distinguish between the quality of the 
elite trio of Polytechnique, ENA and HEC (the variable, Elite) and the quality of all the 
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other “Grandes écoles” (the variable School_non_elite). The results in Panel A (Table 4) 
provide some interesting results. They show a divergence between the elite trio and 
the other “Grandes écoles”. Standing alone in column 1 “Elite” is a highly significant, 
positive determinant of derivatives use. In column 2 “School_non_elite” is negative and 
significant. When tested together, “Elite” remains positive and highly significant, 
while “School_non_elite” changes sign and loses its significance. We interpret this as 
evidence that only “elite” education has a significant effect on derivatives use.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 We perform two robustness tests to support the evidence that only “elite” 
education has a significant effect on derivatives use. First, we include university 
training (University). The results of column 4 (Table 4; Panel A) show that “University” 
is not significant and that its inclusion does not change the results in column 3 in any 
meaningful manner. Second, to make our results comparable to prior studies, we also 
include CEOs with an MBA degree (MBA). The results in column 5 (Table 4; Panel A) 
show that the variable MBA is not statistically significant and its inclusion leaves the 
preceding results substantially unchanged.12  
 As a further robustness test, we breakdown the variable “Elite” into its 
component parts (Polytechnique, ENA, HEC) to see if there is one particular school that 
is driving the results. Table 4 (Panel B) shows that the coefficients of all three schools 
are positive and significant at the 1% level. From this we can say that there is not one 
particular school that is driving the results. However, the coefficients differ 
considerably in magnitude. ENA has the highest coefficient and HEC has the lowest. 
                                                          
12 This finding is similar to Mandal and Doukas (2018). 
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Contrary to results in Table 3 (Panel A), this is evidence that the type of training does 
affect derivatives use, but this is only true for Elite education. 
4.2 Education indexes: Factor Analysis 
 As a further robustness check, we use factor analysis (FA) to construct a set of 
factors that act as barometers of educational attainment. In this context, FA acts as an 
exploratory technique that first establishes the dimensionality of the education 
construct, and then extracts the structure and composition of its dimensions. We then 
use these factors and their individual components to test the robustness of the 
foregoing results. 
 Before undertaking the factor analysis, we perform a number of preliminary 
tests to verify that our data is suitable for FA. To this end, we begin by using the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure to identify problematic variables and consider them for 
elimination.13  Applying this iterative process to the education variables reported in 
Table 1, we eliminate any variables with a KMO below 0.6. The final sample includes 
five variables: Undergraduate, Master, MBA, Elite and School_non_elite. The overall KMO 
for these variables is 0.81 with a relatively high Cronbach alpha equal to 0.8,14 which 
indicates that this data set is suitable for FA.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                                          
13 The test measures sampling adequacy for each variable in the model and for the complete model. The 
statistic is a measure of the proportion of variance among variables that might be common variance. 
Small KMO values (less than 0.5) suggest that FA should not be applied whereas KMO values larger 
than 0.8 indicate that the sample is especially well suited for the methodology. 
14 Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency, that is, how closely related a set of items are as 
a group. It is considered to be a measure of scale reliability. 
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 Table 5 presents the outcomes of the resulting FA. Based on the Kaiser Criterion, 
we find two factors that capture 71.40% of the variance. 15 The first factor, representing 
40.72% of the variation, is a combination of four key variables: Undergraduate degree, 
Masters degree, Elite, School_non_elite. These variables capture the education level. 
Hereafter, this factor is titled “Education_level ”. The next factor loads significantly with 
Elite and School_other_elite. We interpret this factor as measuring the 
“Education_quality”. It is interesting to note that, as in Table 4, this variable loads 
positively with “Elite” and negatively with School_non_elite. Following Tetlock (2007), 
Kaplan et al. (2012) and King et al. (2016), we use these factor loadings to estimate 
individual factor scores for each factor to obtain two new variables: “Education_level” 
and “Education_quality”. These variables are then used to re-estimate the relationship 
between CEO education and derivatives use. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 The results in Table 6 show that Education_level  is positive but not significant, 
which is consistent with the results for the effect of the level of education on derivatives 
(see, Table 3). Education_quality, which is driven positively by “Elite” and negatively 
by “School_non_elite”, is positive and statistically significant. This result is consistent 
with that for the effect of education quality on derivatives use (see, Table 4) and 
underlines the importance of the “Grandes écoles” that is emerging from the study so 
far.    
 
 
                                                          
15 The Kaiser Criterion suggests using only factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1. 
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4.3 Robustness checks 
4.3.1 Industry fixed effects models 
Firms in the same industry are likely to have similar constraints (e.g., 
investment, and technology, etc.) leading to similar financing requirements and 
potentially similar risk-taking profiles. Thus, derivatives use might vary 
systematically across industries together with the type of CEOs employed by firms in 
these industries. The firms in our sample belong to 11 industries following the 
classification of Campbell (1996). All the models in tables 3, 4 and 6 were re-run with 
industry fixed effects replacing firm fixed effects. The results not reported here but 
available on request are qualitatively similar to our main results. Only elite education 
has a significant positive effect on derivatives use. 
4.3.2 Propensity score matched samples 
This section addresses the situation where it is firm characteristics rather than 
CEO characteristics that determine firm derivatives use. For instance, firms with 
certain observable or unobservable characteristics, e.g., sophisticated, complex, 
belonging to certain industries, etc., may prefer to use more derivatives. To this end, 
we employ a propensity score matching procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Propensity score matching allows us to identify a sample of firms that are managed by 
high Education_quality CEOs but reflect no observable differences in characteristics 
with respect to the firms run by CEOs with lower Education_quality. Thus, each pair of 
matched firms is virtually indistinguishable from the other except for one key 
characteristic, namely Education_quality. Matching on observable firm and CEO 
characteristics mitigates concerns related to non-random selection.  
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We begin by estimating a logit model in which the binary dependent variable 
is equal to 1 if the variable Education_quality is positive, and 0 otherwise. We include 
Size, Capex Ratio, Quick Ratio, Leverage, Dividend Ratio and Derivatives in the logit 
equation. This step allows us to determine a propensity score for each firm that 
represents a predicted probability that a firm with given characteristics is run by a 
CEO with high education quality. To ensure that the firms in the control sample are 
sufficiently similar to the firms run by CEOs with high Education_quality, we require 
that the maximum difference between the propensity score of the firm run by the high 
quality educated CEO and that of its matching peer does not exceed 0.1% in absolute 
value. Finally, we compare the level of derivatives use (Derivatives) between the two 
matched samples. The average of Derivatives of firms run by CEOs with high 
Education_quality is 0.1773 compared with 0.0982 for similar firms run by CEOs with 
lower Education quality. The difference is 0.0791 and statistically significant at the 1% 
level.16 More importantly, this result suggests that the education related differences in 
derivatives use are not due to observable differences in firm characteristics and remain 
consistent with our previous findings. 
4.3.3  Endogenous firm-CEO match 
The direction of causality between CEO education and derivatives use is 
unclear ex-ante. It is possible that the matching of a CEO to a particular firm is not the 
result of random assignment and CEOs and firms select one another, leading to strong 
relationships between firm and CEO characteristics (Allgood and Farrell, 2003; Li and 
Ueda, 2006). 
                                                          
16 The results are not reported but available from the authors upon request. 
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In our case, rather than CEO appointments affecting derivatives use, derivatives 
use may affect appointment decisions. For instance, CEOs with high education quality 
may prefer to be at the helm of firms using derivatives because they are more 
comfortable with this kind of financial instrument. Therefore, reverse causality could 
explain the relationship between CEO education and derivatives use. To account for 
endogenous firm-CEO matching, we use two approaches. The first is a two-step 
approach similar to King et al. (2016). It accounts for the possibility that better-
educated CEOs are attracted by firms that use more derivatives. 17 We create a dummy 
variable, denoted as Top_Deriv_Use, that equals 1 if the firm is ranked in the top 25% 
percentile by Derivatives and 0 otherwise and use the following specification 
 
Top_Deriv_Usei,t = β0 + β1 Elitei,t + β2School_non_elitei,t + β2Universityi,t + εi,t 
 
This step allows us to use estimated probabilities that a CEO selects into a firm that 
has a high level of derivatives use. In step two, we use the estimated probabilities that 
capture the likelihood of a CEO being selected into a firm with high levels of 
derivatives use as probability weights and repeat our main analysis. The results 
reported in Table 7, reinforce our main findings; only “Elite” education has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on FC derivatives use and the Education_quality 
variable is positive and statistically significant.  The effect of other non-elite schools 
remains negative as in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
                                                          
17 The two-equation Heckman selection approach cannot be applied here because one does not really 
know or have data on CEO selection criteria. 
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The second approach addresses the potential endogeneity problem using the 
approach of Michaely et al. (2016). It restricts the sample to firms that experienced 
changes in CEOs with different educational backgrounds. By doing so, it avoids the 
overlap between CEO characteristics and firm characteristics and controls for 
unobserved firm characteristics that influence firm hedging policies. We end up with 
a sample of 42 firms and 378 firm-year observations; 122 with Elite equals 1, 135 with 
School_non_elite equals 1, and 120 with University equals 1.  We have one case where 
CEO has no degree in higher education.  The results reported in Table 8, confirm our 
main findings that elite education has a positive and significant effect on FC 
derivatives use and the Education_quality variable is positive and significant. As in 
Tables 4 and 7 the effect of other non-elite schools remains negative.   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
5. Does derivatives use increase firm value? 
5.1. The main analysis 
 Having established the strong positive relationship between elite education and 
the use of derivatives, we turn to the question of how the use of derivatives affects firm 
value.   
 The proxy for firm value using the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q (LnTobinQ) 
where Tobin’s Q is defined as the market capitalization of equity plus the book value 
of debt divided by the book value of total assets. To examine the effect of derivatives 
use on firm value, we control for other known drivers of value (e.g. Allayannis and 
Weston, 2001). These factors are firm size, investment opportunities, liquidity, 
leverage, profitability and the ability to access to financial markets.  
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The proxy for firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets (Size). A number 
of studies, such as Nance et al. (1993), Mian (1996) and Géczy et al. (1997), have found 
that because of the high start-up costs necessary to develop a hedging program, large 
firms are more likely than small firms to use derivatives. There is, however, some 
ambiguity as to how size affects firm value (e.g. Allayannis and Weston, 2001). 
Consequently, we have no prior on the sign.  
For investment opportunities we use the Capex Ratio, defined as the ratio of 
capital expenditures to sales. As Froot et al. (1993) and Géczy et al. (1997) have argued, 
firms that hedge are more likely to have more investment opportunities. Allayannis 
and Weston (2001) find weak evidence of a positive relation between the Capex Ratio 
and firm value. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between the Capex Ratio and 
Tobin’s Q. 
The Quick Ratio (Quick Ratio), defined as the ratio of cash accounts and 
marketable securities to short term liabilities, proxies for liquidity. Based on the free 
cash flow argument of Jensen (1986) that firms with excess free cash flow are more 
likely to invest in projects with negative NPV, firms that are cash constrained may 
have higher Tobin’s Qs because they are more likely to invest in predominantly 
positive NPV projects. From this we expect a negative relationship between the Quick 
Ratio and Tobin’s Q. 
Following Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Jin and Jorion (2006), we use the 
dividend yield (Dividend Ratio) as the proxy for access to financial markets. One 
argument is that limited access to financial markets would have a positive effect on Q 
ratios because only those projects with the highest NPVs could be undertaken (Lang 
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and Stulz, 1994; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Jin and Jorion, 2006). Given this 
interpretation, the expected coefficient would be negative. Another argument, 
however, says that dividends can be viewed as a positive signal from management, 
which should imply a positive coefficient (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988). Thus, we have no 
prior expectation on the sign of the relationship between the Dividend Ratio and 
Tobin’s Q.  
The variable, Leverage, defined above as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
proxies for the measure of the firm’s capital structure. Other things being equal, higher 
leverage reflects a higher probability of financial distress and a negative effect on firm 
value. The tax shield on the other hand reflects a positive effect (see, for instance, 
Haushalter, 2000; and Graham and Rogers, 2002). Thus, we have no a priori on the sign 
of the relationship between Leverage and Tobin’s Q.  
As defined above, the proxy for profitability is return on assets (ROA), the ratio 
of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Based on the argument that the 
market is likely to reward more profitable firms with higher values, we expect ROA to 
be positively related to Tobin’s Q.  
We first examine the value of the use of derivatives unconditionally without 
taking into account differences in CEO education. We then estimate the regression for 
the sample of firms with CEOs graduated from the French elite schools (Elite=1) and 
for the other firms with Elite=0. We use three estimation techniques for these tests: 
pooled OLS with clustered errors at the firm level, the fixed effect specification to 
account for unobserved firm heterogeneity and dynamic panel model methodology to 
control for the potential endogeneity of derivatives use. The preferred estimator for 
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this is the dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) system estimator 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) because (a) the panel consists of 
a small number of time periods (small T) and a large number of firms (large N); (b) the 
dependent variable, LnTobinQ, is dynamic in the sense that a firm performance is likely 
to depend on past realizations and experience time clustering18; c) the GMM system 
explicitly allows for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. These 
dynamic panel data estimations are characterized by two sources of persistence over 
time, namely, autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged-dependent variable 
among the regressors and individual effects characterizing the heterogeneity among 
the individuals (Baltagi, 2010). 
The GMM approach of Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
allows us to treat all the explanatory variables as endogenous (except year dummies) 
and orthogonally uses their past values as their respective instruments. The 
consistency of the GMM estimates is subject to an optimal choice of instruments and 
the absence of higher-order serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term. The 
results of the GMM system of tests reported in Table 9 support the consistency of the 
estimates. The Hansen J-statistic is not significant, indicating that the instruments used 
in the GMM estimation are valid. As expected, the AR(1) and AR(2) tests confirm the 
existence of serial correlation of order one, but not of order two. Also, the dynamic 
nature of firm performance is confirmed. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of the 
previous year’s performance (LnTobinQ t-1) is positive and statistically significant. 
                                                          
18 Moreover, Bond (2002, p.1) argues that "even when coefficients on lagged dependent variables are not of direct 




 Table 9 reports the results for the three specifications. In all three specifications 
derivatives use has a positive effect on firm value (Specifications on all firms). These 
results are consistent with Allayannis and Weston (2001), Carter et al. (2006) and Clark 
and Mefteh (2010), among others. However, when the sample is broken down into elite 
and non-elite groups, the importance of elite training becomes obvious. Derivatives 
use in firms with an elite educated CEO (Elite=1) has a positive, highly significant effect 
on firm value in all three specifications. However, the results are different when the 
CEO is not elite educated (Elite = 0). In the pooled specification (Panel A) derivatives 
use has a highly significant negative effect on firm value. In the fixed effect 
specification (Panel B) derivatives use has a negative, non-significant effect and in the 
dynamic GMM specification (Panel C) the effect is positive but not significant.  
[Insert Table 9 about here]  
5.2  Robustness tests 
 Thus far, our results show that when the CEO is graduated from an elite school, 
FC derivatives are used effectively resulting in an increase in firm value. To check the 
robustness of these results, we re-run our regressions using the variable 
Education_quality  calculated using the factor analysis to construct two sub samples. 
Recall that this variable loads significantly with the variables Elite (positively) and 
School_other_elite (negatively). From this we construct two sub-samples: A sub-sample 
of firm values for firms with negative values for Education_quality and another sub-
sample of firm values for firms with positive values for Education_quality.  The results 
are reported in Table 10. They are broadly similar to those of Table 9.  For firms with 
positive (negative) values of Education_quality derivatives use is positive (negative) 
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and statistically significant (not significant). These results reinforce our earlier results 
and provide more reinforcing evidence that elite education is driving the profitable 
use of FC derivatives.  
[Insert Table 10 about here]  
6. Summary and conclusions 
 In this paper we take advantage of the clear-cut distinctions of the French 
educational system to empirically evaluate the effect of the level, type and quality of 
educational training on firm derivatives use and the effect of the latter on firm value. 
Our main finding is that elite institutions including, Polytechnique, ENA and HEC are 
the only aspect of the French educational system with any significant influence on 
derivatives use and firm performance. More specifically, we find that “elite” education 
reflected in these three institutions, together and standing alone, has a positive, 
strongly significant impact on derivatives use. We also find that across these three 
institutions, the type of training affects derivatives use. ENA, the political educational 
school, has the largest effect, HEC, the business school, has the second largest and 
Polytechnique, the engineering school, has the lowest. Outside of these three institutions, 
we find no significant relationship between the type of training and derivatives use 
and between the level of education and derivatives use. These results are robust to a 
battery of tests that includes alternative estimation techniques, use of different 
subsamples, additional control variables, and control for endogeneity. 
 The role the elite institutions is clearer when we assess the effect of derivatives 
use on firm performance. We find that for whole sample the use of derivatives does 
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increase firm performance. However, when we break down the sample according to 
education quality, derivatives use is positive and significant only for firms with CEOs 
coming from the three elite schools. It is negative but not always significant for non-
elite CEOs.  
 Overall, we can attribute the foregoing results to three factors acting together. 
The first one refers to the attractiveness of the elite institutions and the very selective 
merit system that ensures an exceptionally high level of students. The second one is 
the utilitarian culture of the “Grandes écoles” oriented towards practical matters and 
decision-making that are so important for effective risk management. The third factor 
refers to the amount and quality of the financial and human resources employed in the 




Appendix. Pairwise correlation matrix of variables.         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Derivatives 1.0000 
           
(2) Management 0.0577 1.0000 
          
(3) Engineering 0.0122 -0.0484* 1.0000 
         
(4) Other_high_education -0.1001 -0.0527* -0.3091* 1.0000 
        
(5) Undergraduate -0.0504 0.1318* -0.3081* 0.1326* 1.0000 
       
(6) Master -0.0593 -0.0346 -0.0737* 0.0987* -0.1033* 1.0000 
      
(7) Phd -0.0181 -0.0344 -0.0656* 0.1617* -0.1493* -0.0754* 1.0000 
     
(8) University -0.0680** 0.0613* -0.3559* 0.2629* 0.0697* 0.2920* 0.1694* 1.0000 
    
(9) School 0.1071** 0.0369 0.0409* -0.0445* -0.0650* -0.3472* -0.1255* -0.0885* 1.0000 
   
(10 ) Elite 0.2337*** -0.0587 0.3424* -0.2653* -0.2751* -0.1470* -0.1515* -0.3750* 0.4235* 1.0000 
  
(11) School_non_elite -0.1165* 0.0889* 0.0655* -0.1706* -0.3533* -0.1884 0.0231 -0.3807* 0.5428* -0.3310 1.0000 
 
(12) MBA 0.0892 0.2322* -0.1839* -0.1225* -0.1221* 0.1904* 0.0212 -0.0315 0.0585 -0.1738 0.2158* 1.0000 
(13) Polytechnique 0.1465*** -0.3829* 0.0475* -0.1539* -0.1877* -0.0948* -0.0586 -0.2418* 0.2731** 0.6448 -0.3424* -0.1121* 
(14) ENA 0.1862*** 0.1860* 0.1286* -0.1312* -0.1125* -0.0660* -0.0954* -0.1684* 0.1902** 0.4492 -0.2385* -0.0781* 
(15) HEC 0.0190** 0.2339* -0.1852* -0.1234* -0.1134* -0.0621* -0.0898* -0.1585* 0.1789* 0.4225 -0.2244* -0.0734* 
(16) CEO_Age 0.1232** 0.0944* 0.0695* -0.1886* -0.1584* 0.0535 0.0802* -0.0100 0.0192 0.1178 -0.0917* 0.0682* 
(17) CEO_Tenure  -0.1272** -0.0878* -0.1311* 0.1888* -0.0007 -0.1078* 0.1935* 0.0764* -0.2096* -0.2511 0.0388 -0.0344 
(18) Size 0.0929* 0.0025 0.2226* -0.1797* -0.0427 -0.0161 -0.1644 -0.1208* 0.1507 0.3242 -0.1596* -0.0724* 
(19) Capex Ratio -0.0037 -0.0035 -0.0422 0.0839* -0.0604* -0.0100 -0.0258 -0.0705* 0.0518 -0.0452 0.0903* 0.0781 
(20) Quick Ratio -0.0126 -0.0426 -0.0585 0.0567 -0.0162 0.1303 0.0972* 0.0791* -0.0455 -0.2029 0.1459* 0.0421 
(21) Leverage -0.0673* 0.0167 -0.0004 0.0313 0.0505 -0.0463 -0.0332 -0.0878* 0.0365 0.0489 -0.0112 0.0650* 
(22) Dividend Ratio -0.0731* 0.0399 0.0816 -0.1023 -0.1251* 0.0484 -0.1127* -0.0895* 0.0877* 0.1201 -0.0290 0.0504 
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 Continued 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
  
(13) Polytechnique 1.0000 
           
(14) ENA -0.1200* 1.0000 
          
(15) HEC -0.1129* -0.0786* 1.0000 
         
(16) CEO_Age 0.0757* 0.1362* -0.0381 1.0000 
        
(17) CEO_Tenure  -0.1745* -0.1637* -0.0343 0.2406** 1.0000 
       
(18) Size 0.2211* 0.2891* -0.0311 0.2235** -0.3318* 1.0000 
      
 (19) Capex Ratio -0.0467 0.0112 -0.0277 0.0645*** -0.0361 0.0187 1.0000 
     
(20) Quick Ratio -0.1687* -0.1170* -0.0053 -0.1548*** 0.1543** -0.0403** -0.0856 1.0000 
    
(21) Leverage 0.0380 0.0888* -0.0588 0.0670** -0.0493 0.2539* 0.1415 -0.2352** 1.0000 
   
(22) Dividend Ratio 0.0315 0.0900* 0.0774 0.1859** -0.0804 0.2805*** 0.0940 -0.0608** 0.0225 1.0000 
  
This appendix shows Pearson pairs-wise sample correlations. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% level or better. Derivatives is defined as the notional amount of 
foreign currency derivatives divided by total assets. Management is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has training in management and 0 otherwise. 
Engineering is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is an Engineer but doesn’t hold an MBA and 0 otherwise. Other_high_education is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the CEO has higher education training in a subject other than management or engineering and 0 otherwise. Undergraduate is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the CEO holds only an undergraduate degree (i.e., DEUG or “licence”, a two or three year university undergraduate degree, respectively) and 0 otherwise. 
Master is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds only a “Master” degree and 0 otherwise. Phd is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO 
holds a Phd degree and 0 otherwise.. University is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from the university and 0 otherwise. School is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from a School and 0 otherwise. Elite is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from one 
of the French elite  schools (ENA, Polytechnique and HEC), and 0 otherwise. School_non_elite is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from a 
School other than ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 0 otherwise.  MBA is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds an MBA and 0 otherwise. Polytechnique 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from Polytechnique and 0 otherwise. ENA is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from ENA and 0 otherwise. HEC is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from HEC and 0 otherwise.  CEO_Age is the CEO's age in 
years CEO_Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has been the CEO. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Capex Ratio is the ratio of total capital 
expenditure to total assets (millions). Quick Ratio is the ratio of cash accounts and marketable securities to short-term liabilities. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets. Dividend Ratio is the dividend per share divided by the share price.  
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Table 1.  CEO elite education variables 
Panel A. Education variables 
This table presents the variables used to describe CEO elite Education background. Three categories of 




A dummy A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the CEO has no higher education degree and 0 otherwise. 
Education type   
Engineering 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
an Engineer without an MBA, and 0 otherwise. 
Management 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has 
received management training, and 0 otherwise. 
Other_high_education 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has 
higher education training in a subject other than 
management and engineering and 0 otherwise. 
Education level 
Undergraduate 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds 
only an undergraduate degree (i.e., DEUG or “licence”, a 
two or three year university undergraduate degree, 
respectively), and 0 otherwise. 
Master 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO 
holds only a “Master” degree and 0 otherwise. 
Phd 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO 
holds a Phd degree and 0 otherwise. 
School 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from a School and 0 otherwise. 
Education quality 
University 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from the university and 0 otherwise. 
School 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from a School and 0 otherwise   
Elite 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from one of the French elite  schools (ENA, 
Polytechnique and HEC), and 0 otherwise 
School_non_elite 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from a non-elite School (other than ENA, 
Polytechnique and  HEC), and 0 otherwise. 
HEC 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from HEC, and 0 otherwise. 
Polytechnique 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from Polytechnique and 0 otherwise. 
ENA 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from the ENA, and 0 otherwise. 
MBA 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO 






Panel B. The frequency distribution of the education variables 
This panel shows the frequency distribution of the education variables. The sample consists of French 
listed firms observed over 2004–2012 with a total of 1089 firm/year observations. 4.86% (53 out of 
1089) of firms are headed by CEOs with no degree in higher education.  
 
  
Number of observations with 
variable equals to 
Number of 
observations 
Variables 0 1   
No_degree 1036 53   
Engineering 865 224   
Management 463 626   
Other_high_education 903 186   
Total 1089 
No_degree 1036 53  
University 813 276  
School 329 760  
Total  1089 
University components      
Undergraduate 918 171  
Master 1035 54  
Phd 1038 51  
Total  276 
School components      
School_non_elite 649 440  
Elite 769 320  
Total 760 
Elite Components      
Polytechnique 929 160  
ENA 1 004 85  
HEC 1 014 75  
Total  320 










Table 2.  Descriptive statistics for derivatives use and control variables.  
This table presents summary statistics of the dependent variable and the control variables in the model (1). 
Derivatives is defined as the notional amount of foreign currency derivatives divided by total assets. CEO_Age is 
the CEO's age in years CEO_Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has been the CEO. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets measured in millions. Capex Ratio is the ratio of total capital expenditure to 
total assets. Quick Ratio is the ratio of cash accounts and marketable securities to short-term liabilities. Leverage 










variable               
Derivatives 0.0000 0.0000 0.1152 0.0999 0.8225 1.0000 0.2211 
Control variable               
CEO_Age (years)  35.0000 49.0000 55.1008 54.0000 60.0000 79.0000 7.5409 
CEO_Tenure (years) 0.0000 3.0000 10.2635 8.0000 17.0000 47.0000 9.8784 
Size 15.6763 18.9511 21.2216 20.3925 22.2508 26.1974 2.3140 
Capex Ratio 0.0011 0.0335 0.0489 0.0578 0.4410 0.4686 0.0474 
Quick Ratio 0.2375 0.7031 1.0171 0.8993 1.1638 3.7579 0.5114 
Leverage 0.0000 0.0615 0.1652 0.1580 0.2626 0.5828 0.1246 




Table 3.  CEO education and derivatives use 
This table reports the results of regressing Derivatives on CEO education variables, CEO characteristics and firm characteristics. The sample consists of large non-financial 
firms observed in the period 2004 to 2012 with a total of 1,089 firm/year observations. Derivatives is defined as the notional amount of foreign currency derivatives divided by 
total assets. Engineering is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is an Engineer but doesn’t hold an MBA and 0 otherwise. Management is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has training in management and 0 otherwise. Other_high_education is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has higher 
education training in a subject other than management or engineering and 0 otherwise. Undergraduate is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds only an 
undergraduate degree (i.e., DEUG or “licence”, a two or three year university undergraduate degree, respectively), and 0 otherwise. A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the CEO holds only a “Master” degree and 0 otherwise. Phd is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds a Phd degree and 0 otherwise. School is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from a School and 0 otherwise. University is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from 
the university and 0 otherwise. CEO_Age is the CEO's age in years, CEO_Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has been the CEO. Size is the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s total assets (millions). Capex Ratio is the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. Quick Ratio is the ratio of cash accounts and marketable securities to short-term 
liabilities. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Dividend Ratiois the dividend per share divided by the share price. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. The model includes year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
Variables Panel A. Education type Panel B. Education level Panel C. Education quality 
Engineering 0.0112  
      
 (0.7660)       
Management 0.0055 
      
 (0.8880)       
Other_high_education –0.0840 
      
 (0.1011)       
Undergraduate   0.0424  0.0294  
   
   (0.5731) (0.696)    
Master   0.0126 –0.0355 
   
   (0.6420) (0.4161)    
Phd   –0.114* –0.0508 
   
   (0.0742) (0.5101)    
School    0.0657* 
 
0.0494 * 0.0604** 
    (0.0611)  (0.0590) (0.0407) 





      (0.0883)  (0.8720) 
       
CEO_Age  0.0037** 0.0458*** 0.0450*** 0.0043*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0053) (0.0071) (0.0077) 
CEO_Tenure  –0.0035*** –0.0359*** –0.0359*** –0.0039*** –0.0037*** –0.0036*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0048) 
Size –0.0204*** –0.0200*** –0.0197*** –0.0191*** –0.0192*** –0.0193*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Capex Ratio 0.0012 0.00145 0.00136 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 
 (0.569) (0.492) (0.518) (0.525) (0.520) (0.518) 
Quick Ratio –0.0335** –0.0339** –0.0345** –0.0353** –0.0348** –0.0347** 
 (0.0298) (0.0286) (0.0259) (0.0225) (0.0242) (0.0249) 
Leverage –0.0559 –0.0630 –0.0704 –0.0664 –0.0655 –0.0649 
 (0.3621) (0.3050) (0.2531) (0.2792) (0.2852) (0.2901) 
Dividend Ratio –0.0107*** –0.0103** –0.0105** –0.0105** –0.0104** –0.0104** 
 (0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0124) 
Constant 0.382*** 0.272* 0.274* 0.332*** 0.293** 0.284** 
 (0.0049) (0.0564) (0.0536) (0.0095) (0.0213) (0.0451) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 




 Table 4. Quality of training: Elite schools versus non-elite schools 
This table reports the results of regressing Derivatives on CEO education variables, CEO characteristics and firm characteristics. The sample consists of large non-
financial firms observed in the period 2004 to 2012 with a total of 1,089 firm/year observations. Derivatives is defined as the notional amount of foreign currency derivatives 
divided by total assets. Elite is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from one of the French prestigious schools ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 
0 otherwise. School_non_elite is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from a School other than ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 0 otherwise. 
University is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from the university and 0 otherwise. MBA is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO holds an MBA and 0 otherwise. Polytechnique is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from Polytechnique and 0 otherwise. ENA is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from ENA and 0 otherwise. HEC is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from 
HEC and 0 otherwise. CEO_Age is the CEO's age in years CEO_Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has been the CEO. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets (millions). Capex Ratio is the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. Quick Ratio is the ratio of cash accounts and marketable securities to short-term liabilities. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Dividend Ratiois the dividend per share divided by the share price. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 




Panel A.  
Quality of Training: Elite Schools versus Non-Elite Schools 
Panel B.  
Polytechnique vs ENA versus HEC 
           
Elite   0.107***  0.115*** 0.120* 0.117*   
  (0.0000)  (0.000182) (0.0948) (0.0904)   
School_non_elite   –0.0470** 0.0118 0.0176 0.0082   
    (0.0362) (0.6651) (0.8041) (0.9091)   
University     0.0062 0.0089   
      (0.9313) (0.9015)   
MBA      0.0678   
           (0.3950)   
Polytechnique        0.1292*** 
         (0.0003) 
ENA        0.1391*** 
         (0.0005) 
HEC        0.0681*** 
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         (0.0012) 
School_non_elite        0.0104 
         (0.704) 
CEO_Age  0.0034** 0.0043*** 0.0034** 0.0034** 0.0036** 0.00318** 
  (0.0233) (0.0048) (0.0251) (0.0269) (0.0193) (0.0375) 
CEO_Tenure  –0.0036*** –0.0041*** –0.0035*** –0.0035*** –0.0033*** –0.0032*** 
  (0.0027) (0.0006) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0079) (0.0086) 
Size –0.0207*** –0.0192*** –0.0208*** –0.0209*** –0.0203*** –0.0214*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Capex Ratio 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017 0.0017 0.0015 0.00170 
  (0.391) (0.3892) (0.4061) (0.4061) (0.4802) (0.4192) 
Quick Ratio –0.0347** –0.0347** –0.0347** –0.0347** –0.0354** –0.0351** 
  (0.0236) (0.0248) (0.0236) (0.0241) (0.0212) (0.0221) 
Leverage –0.0696 –0.0641 –0.0697 –0.0693 –0.0754 –0.0686 
  (0.2532) (0.2951) (0.2523) (0.2564) (0.2164) (0.2631) 
Dividend Yield –0.0108*** –0.0102** –0.0109*** –0.0108*** –0.0108*** –0.0107*** 
  (0.0083) (0.0134) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0091) 
Constant 0.365*** 0.342*** 0.361*** 0.358** 0.330** 0.380*** 
  (0.0038) (0.0078) (0.0046) (0.0113) (0.0202) (0.0022) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 




Table 5. Factor Analysis 
This table presents factor loadings of the first two factors based on five education characteristics for 1089 firm-year 
observations in our sample from 2004 to 2012. Factor loadings are calculated using a normalised orthogonal varimax rotation.  
Undergraduate is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds at least a DEUG and at best a 
“licence” (a two or three-year university undergraduate degree) from the university and 0 otherwise. Master is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds at least a “Masters” from the university but not a Phd 
and 0 otherwise. MBA is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds an MBA and 0 otherwise. 
Elite is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from one of the French prestigious 
schools ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 0 otherwise. School_non_elite is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the CEO is graduated from a School other than ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 0 otherwise. Factor loadings 
with absolute value less than 0.5 are blank (as in King et al. (2016)). The factors have been sorted by the percentage 
of variance explained. 
 
 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 
Undergraduate –0.8846  
Master 0.9068  
MBA   
PhD   
Elite  0.9026 
School_non_elite  –0.8415 
 Eigenvalue 2.0357 1.5345 
% Variance explained 0.4072 0.3069 





Table 6. The Effect of Education Level and Quality on Derivatives Use 
This table reports the results of regressing Derivatives on CEO education level and quality, CEO characteristics 
and firm characteristics. The sample consists of large non-financial firms observed in the period 2004 to 2012 with 
a total of 1,089 firm/year observations. Derivatives is defined as the notional amount of foreign currency 
derivatives divided by total assets. Education_level  represents the first factor scores and Education_quality   the 
second factor scores obtained from the factor analysis. CEO_Age is the CEO's age in years CEO_Tenure is the 
number of years that the CEO has been the CEO. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Capex 
Ratio is the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets (millions). Quick Ratio is the ratio of cash accounts and 
marketable securities to short-term liabilities. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Dividend Ratio 
is the dividend per share divided by the share price. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The model includes year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and 








CEO_Age  0.0035** 
 (0.0209) 




Capex Ratio 0.0017 
 (0.4010) 









Firm fixed effects         Yes 






















Table 7.  Robustness checks: endogenous firm-CEO matching (A two-step approach) 
This table shows the impact of the CEO education variables on the derivatives use (Derivatives) whilst controlling 
for potential CEO-firm endogenous selection bias. Derivatives is defined as the notional amount of foreign 
currency derivatives divided by total assets. . Elite is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is 
graduated from one of the French prestigious schools ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 0 otherwise. 
School_non_elite is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from a School other than 
ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 0 otherwise. University is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO 
is graduated from the university and 0 otherwise. Education_level represents the first factor scores and 
Education_quality   the second factor scores obtained from the factor analysis. CEO_Age is the CEO's age in years 
CEO_Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has been the CEO. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
total assets. Capex Ratio is the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. Quick Ratio is the ratio of cash 
accounts and marketable securities to short-term liabilities. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
Dividend Ratiois the dividend per share divided by the share price. We include in the regressions, eight individual 
dummy variables which equal either one or zero for each year from 2005 to 2012, with 2004 being the excluded 
year. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables Equation1 Equation2 Equation3 Equation4 Equation5 
Elite 0.0946***   0.0610*  
 (0.0044)   (0.0747)  
School_non_elite  –0.0587**  –0.0348  
  (0.0236)  (0.2803)  
University   –0.0447 –0.0320  
   (0.1112) (0.3144)  
Education_level      0.0102 
     (0.1351) 
Education_quality     0.0395*** 
     (0.0000) 
CEO_Age  0.0058** 0.0062** 0.0066** 0.00579*** 0.0057*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0200) (0.0122) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CEO_Tenure  –0.0044** –0.0051** –0.0052** –0.0044*** –0.0044*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Size 0.0014 0.0037 0.0051 0.0014 0.0016 
 (0.8671) (0.6452) (0.5203) (0.7921) (0.7513) 
Capex Ratio 0.0014 0.0015 0.0004 0.0014 0.0015 
 (0.7922) (0.7832) (0.9914) (0.5945) (0.5754) 
Quick Ratio 0.0196 0.0135 0.0093 0.0198 0.0186 
 (0.5520) (0.6801) (0.7781) (0.2970) (0.3270) 
Leverage –0.268** –0.273*** –0.286*** –0.268*** –0.262*** 
 (0.0119) (0.00910) (0.00723) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Dividend Ratio –0.0203** –0.0191** –0.0195** –0.0203*** –0.0204*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0171) (0.0134) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant –0.1690 –0.1701 –0.2193 –0.1356 –0.1392 
 (0.3602) (0.3454) (0.2333) (0.2616) (0.2501) 
Year  effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,089 1,089 1,089 1,089 1,089 








Table 8.  Robustness checks: endogenous firm-CEO matching (test on sample of firms that 
changed CEO with different educational background) 
This table shows the impact of the CEO education variables on the derivatives use (Derivatives). The sample is 
restricted to firms that changed CEO with different educational background. Derivatives is defined as the notional 
amount of foreign currency derivatives divided by total assets. . Elite is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the CEO is graduated from one of the French prestigious schools ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 0 otherwise. 
School_non_elite is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from a School other than 
ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 0 otherwise. University is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO 
is graduated from the university and 0 otherwise. Education_level  represents the first factor scores and 
Education_quality  the second factor scores obtained from the factor analysis. CEO_Age  is the CEO's age in years 
CEO_Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has been the CEO. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
total assets. Capex Ratio is the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. Quick Ratio is the ratio of cash 
accounts and marketable securities to short-term liabilities. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
Dividend Ratiois the dividend per share divided by the share price. We include in the regressions, eight individual 
dummy variables which equal either one or zero for each year from 2005 to 2012, with 2004 being the excluded 
year. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample is restricted to firms 
that changed CEO with different educational backgrounds 
Variables Equation1 Equation2 Equation3 Equation4 Equation5 
Elite 0.0868***   0.106***  
 (0.0073)   (0.0052)  
School_non_elite  –0.0055**  0.0379  
  (0.027)   (0.818)  
University   –0.0791 –0.0244  
   (0.848) (0.882)  
Education_level      0.0276** 
     (0.0295) 
Education_quality     0.0290** 
     (0.0431) 
CEO_Age  0.00758* –0.0011* 0.0001* 90.0001* –0.0059* 
 (0.0709) (0.0601) (0.0972) (0.0965) (0.0773) 
CEO_Tenure  –0.0032* 0.0096 0.0164 0.0085* 0.0049* 
 (0.0855) (0.594) (0.358) (0.0634) (0.0782) 
Size –0.0276*** –0.0283*** –0.0334*** –0.0301*** –0.0296*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0042) 
Capex Ratio 0.0050* 0.0047* 0.0041 0.0044 0.0045 
 (0.0690) (0.0910) (0.1430) (0.1101) (0.1063) 
Quick Ratio 0.0873*** 0.0917*** 0.0949*** 0.0920*** 0.0908*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0069) (0.0044) (0.0064) (0.0072) 
Leverage –0.0889 –0.0620 –0.0717 –0.0953 –0.0852 
 (0.3951) (0.5505) (0.4922) (0.3632) (0.4144) 
Dividend Ratio –0.0147** –0.0137* –0.0144** –0.0151** –0.0147** 
 (0.0364) (0.0531) (0.0404) (0.0309) (0.0364) 
Constant 0.6563*** 0.6748*** 0.8744*** 0.7311** 0.7233*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0008) (0.0168) (0.0037) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 9. Firm value, Derivatives use and CEO Education. 
This table reports the results of regressing LnTobinQ on Derivatives and control variables. The tests are run for the entire sample, for the sub-sample with CEO graduated from 
schools other than elite and for the sub-sample of firms with CEO graduated from Elite Schools. We used three specifications: pooled OLS with clustered errors at the firm 
level, panel fixed effect specification and the dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) system estimator. LnTobinQ is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q.  Tobin’s Q 
is equal to the market capitalization plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. Derivatives is defined as the notional amount of foreign currency 
derivatives divided by total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Capex Ratio is the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. Quick Ratio is the 
ratio of cash accounts and marketable securities to short-term liabilities. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Dividend Ratiois the dividend per share divided 
by the share price. ROA is the earnings before interest and taxes on the book value of assets. We include in the regressions, eight individual dummy variables which equal either 
one or zero for each year from 2005 to 2012, with 2004 being the excluded year. ELITE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is graduated from one of the 
French prestigious schools ENA, Polytechnique or HEC and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All the specifications include 
year dummies. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in residuals. The Hansen test of exogeneity of the instruments subset tests the null 
hypothesis of exogenous instruments. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 























Derivatives 0.0536*** 0.0158*** 0.00213*** –0.0188*** –0.0999 –0.0005 0.0745*** 0.0257*** 0.0018*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.2706) (0.9715) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Size –0.0358** –0.0610*** –0.0731** –0.0261 –0.0897*** –0.122** –0.0451 0.0462* 0.0270 
 (0.0282) (0.0000) (0.0369) (0.154) (0.0000) (0.0128) (0.118) (0.0579) (0.383) 
Capex Ratio 0.0132*** 0.00473 0.00139 0.0132** 0.0053 0.0084** 0.0152 –0.0058 –0.0308*** 
 (0.0088) (0.1566) (0.7707) (0.0158) (0.1411) (0.0208) (0.2068) (0.6002) (0.0087) 
Quick Ratio 0.455*** 0.235*** 0.250*** 0.441*** 0.220*** 0.188** 0.447*** 0.297*** 0.167* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0043) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0223) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0717) 
Leverage 0.1430 0.2080* 0.1519 –0.0910 –0.0263 –0.2475 0.4425 0.4715** 0.5465* 
 (0.505) (0.0871) (0.612) (0.691) (0.865) (0.462) (0.235) (0.0109) (0.0954) 
Dividend Ratio –0.0114 –0.0331*** –0.0462*** –0.0304 –0.0303*** –0.0544*** 0.0298 –0.0390*** –0.0699*** 






















(0.6504) (0.0000) (0.1309) (0.0941) (0.0000) (0.8921) (0.7007) (0.1734) (0.0000) 
L.LnTobinQ    1.475*    0.233***   0.0785** 
    (0.0556)    (0.0006)   (0.0183) 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.4588 0.8144*** 1.1626*** 0.3800 1.4873*** 2.6522** –0.0404 –1.2726** –1.0941** 
 (0.1972) (0.00418) (0.0005) (0.3470) (0.0000) (0.0114) (0.947) (0.0171) (0.0140) 
             
Observations 1089 1089 968 769 769 582 320 320 219 
R––squared 0.432 0.516  0.440 0.520   0.414 0.592 
 
Hansen  J–stat  
(chi–square, 
pvalue) 
   
174.12 
(p=0.6450) 
   
143.25 
(p=0.4333) 




AR(1) (z, p–value) 
   
–4.7612 
(p=0.0000) 
   
–4.2441 
(p=0.0000) 
  –3.8392 
(p=0.0001) 
Arellano–Bond 
AR(2) (z, p–value) 
   
0.5066 
(p=0.6124) 
   
0.4728 
(p=0.6364) 






Table 10. Firm value, Derivatives use and CEO Education using factor scores. 
This table reports the results of regressing LnTobinQ on Derivatives and control variables. The tests are run for 
the sub-sample of firms with Education_quality  factor score negative and for the sub-sample of firms with 
Education_quality  factor score positive. We used three specifications: pooled OLS with clustered errors at the 
firm level, panel fixed effect specification and the dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) system 
estimator. LnTobinQ is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is equal to the market capitalization plus the 
book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. Derivatives is defined as the notional amount of 
foreign currency derivatives divided by total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Capex 
Ratio is the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. Quick Ratio is the ratio of cash accounts and marketable 
securities to short-term liabilities. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Dividend Ratiois the 
dividend per share divided by the share price. ROA is the earnings before interest and taxes on the book value of 
assets. We include in the regressions, eight individual dummy variables which equal either one or zero for each 
year from 2005 to 2012, with 2004 being the excluded year. Education_quality  is the second factor scores obtained 
from the factor analysis. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All the 
specifications include year dummies. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
in residuals. The Hansen test of exogeneity of the instruments subset tests the null hypothesis of exogenous 
instruments. P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 


















Derivatives –0.0185 –0.0101 –0.0026 0.0001* 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 
 (0.1011) (0.2751) (0.8452) (0.0947) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Size –0.0390*** –0.0869*** –0.115** –0.0207** 0.0018 –0.0004 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0209) (0.0342) (0.9214) (0.9819) 
Capex Ratio 0.0112*** 0.00481 0.00829** –0.0088 –0.0148* –0.0356*** 
 (0.0006) (0.1902) (0.0263) (0.1801) (0.0842) (0.0026) 
Quick Ratio 0.399*** 0.220*** 0.198** 0.319*** 0.243*** 0.213* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0219) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0626) 
Leverage 0.1162 0.0464 –0.193 0.5432*** 0.5492*** 0.5311* 
 (0.4040) (0.7711) (0.5840) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0853) 
Dividend Ratio –0.0357*** –0.0292*** –0.0552*** –0.0202* –0.0708*** –0.0731*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0071) (0.0009) (0.0648) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ROA 
0.0241*** 0.0072** 0.0002 0.0503*** 0.0410*** 0.0474*** 
(0.0000) (0.0105) (0.9581) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
L.LnTobinQ    0.231***    0.0416 
    (0.0006)    (0.3115) 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1091* 1.3642*** 2.4866** –0.352* –0.5937* –0.4444* 
 (0.0562) (0.0000) (0.0199) (0.0636) (0.0691) (0.0553) 
           
Observations 715 715 539 374 374 262 
R–squared 0.491 0.528   0.567 0.678   
Hansen  J–stat  
(chi–square, pvalue) 
   
139.83 
(p=0.396) 
   
164.79 





   
–4.1513 
(p=0.0000) 





    
0.51677   
(p= 0.6053) 
    
–1,24 
(p=0.22) 
 
 
